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Abstract: In the past few decades, the rise in attacks on communication devices in networks has
resulted in a reduction of network functionality, throughput, and performance. To detect and mitigate
these network attacks, researchers, academicians, and practitioners developed Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) with automatic response systems. The response system is considered an important
component of IDS, since without a timely response IDSs may not function properly in countering
various attacks, especially on a real-time basis. To respond appropriately, IDSs should select the
optimal response option according to the type of network attack. This research study provides
a complete survey of IDSs and Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) on the basis of our in-depth
understanding of the response option for different types of network attacks. Knowledge of the path
from IDS to IRS can assist network administrators and network staffs in understanding how to tackle
different attacks with state-of-the-art technologies.
Keywords: intrusion; attacks; information security; response option; intrusion detection
1. Introduction
As a result of the technological advances in recent years, we have become increasingly dependent
on global networks when engaging in social, business, and educational activities. With the explosive
use of computer networks, a number of security issues on the Internet and in computer systems
have been raised. Hence, the security of Internet-connected devices from various threats has become
considerably important to ensure system availability and integrity [1]. Based on the annual report of
2016 from Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) showed a tremendous increment
in the amount of intrusions and cyber-attacks over the decade [2]. Similarly, according to a report
from the Malaysia CERT published in 2016, 43% of 9986 malicious incidents involve intrusions
during system operating hours [3]. An intrusion is a set of actions that violate security policies,
including the integrity and confidentiality of data and the availability of services as well, by exploiting
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the vulnerabilities in the security procedure and the implementation of the system monitored by
an IDS [4,5]. By contrast, attacks can be said to be adversarial intrusions against IDS or simply
a set of actions that violate the security policies associated with the IDS itself [5,6]. Despite the
development of several defensive techniques such as cryptography, firewalls, and access control for
secure communication, these anti-threat systems currently possess limitation in detecting intrusion
attacks. Therefore, an IDS with appropriate countermeasures, such as an intrusion response system
(IRS), is essential for detecting and responding to potential intrusions and attacks [7].
IDSs are the hardware or software systems that autonomously identify and response
in-appropriate events (such as intrusion attacks) occur in computer systems [4]. Depending on
IDS settings and configurations, IRSs can continuously monitor system health and apply suitable
countermeasures to identify and respond to potential incidents and inappropriate activities effectively
and hence ensures optimal security in any computing environment [8]. IDS is categorized into
three types, namely intrusion tolerance, intrusion prevention system (IPS), and IRS [6,7]. The term
“intrusion tolerance” is defined by [6], the capability of a personal computer system to maintain
its integrity, confidentiality, and availability even when some of its components are being infected.
An intrusion-prevention-system (IPS) is an IDS that generates a proactive response to stop attacks
before they occur [8]. In contrast, IRS is always activated after the detection of attacks by IDS and is
always generates reactive response. However, existing IDSs only provide a limited response approach
and are inadequate to provide optimum response in detected intrusions. Therefore, a response option
should be deployed according to the nature of attacks and IDS confidence should be improved in
attaining suitable response.
Although IRSs have always been used with IDSs, they have been few research studies conducted
on IRSs by academicians and researchers. Firewalls prevent external attacks only and mostly fail to
detect internal attacks. To mitigate internal attacks, an intrusion detection and response system that
detects and responds to threats in real time is needed. Therefore, security-related problems need to be
correctly identified to ensure that suitable response options are selected for detected possible attacks.
However, not all incidents are malicious in nature; for instance, a person may mistakenly obtain access
to a different system by typing the address of a computer without authorization. In a different instance
the same action might be performed by a cybercriminal and such an action is regarded as malicious
because cybercriminals are highly skilled programmers with the intent to exploit vulnerabilities in
computer systems. Thus, there is need for an IRS to distinguish malicious activity (cyber-criminal)
from non-malicious activity (a person mistakenly obtaining access) and select an appropriate response
option accordingly.
Furthermore, the response options should be selected according to the attacker’s activity.
For example, when an attacker has already logged out, terminating the session of the attacker will not
be appropriate and will have no effect. Similarly, the attackers try to launch denial of service (DOS) or
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to make the resources unavailable to authorized users.
A response option that increases service availability and performance is imperative. In spoof attacks,
internal attacks, distributed attacks, and password-based attacks, attackers attempts to get access to
personal data that is stored on a personal computer. Once the attacker gets access to the confidential
information, the attacker can easily modify the stored data; in such cases, the response should be to
enforce data integrity and confidentiality. In probing, phishing, and eavesdropping, attackers mostly
attempt to collect credentials from the worldwide network and information about susceptibility as
well. Thus, these types of attacks require a response option that improves data confidentiality and
service availability.
This study aims to categorize network attacks and review the general attacks that may occur in
computer systems. In addition, this study proposes response options according to intrusion and attack
statistics. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A description of different attacks detected
by IDSs and a comparison of attacks according to affected parameters are presented in Section 2.
Section 3 explains the common solution to intrusions. Section 4 describes the comparison of attacks
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according to the affected parameters and various threats. Section 5 illustrates the responses to possible
attacks. Sections 6 and 7 present the current challenges faced by IRSs and future directions. Finally, the
conclusions of the study are presented in Section 8. Table 1 briefly outlines a list of acronyms used in
this research paper.
Table 1. List of acronyms.
Symbol Description
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IRS Intrusion Response System
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IDRS Intrusion Detection and Response System
DIDS Distributed Intrusion Detection System
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
DOS Denial of Service
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service
NIDS Network-Based Intrusion Detection System
HIDS Host-Based Intrusion Detection System
AD Anomaly Detection
SD Signature Based Detection
AIRS Automatic Intrusion Response System
AAIRS Adaptive Automatic Intrusion Response System
CSM Cooperating Security Managers
MANET Mobile Ad hoc Network
GIDP Generalized Intrusion Detection System
IDAR Intrusion-Detection and-Adaptive Response-Mechanism
AudES Audit Expert System
2. Types of Intrusion
At the moment the majority of networks are basically unsecured, which creates opportunities for
cybercriminals to access secure data. Attackers are interested in stealing information and also attempt
to make digital resources unavailable to users. Numerous defensive techniques such as access control,
cryptography, and firewalls can function as the front line of defense against external and internal
attacks [6]. Firewalls mainly secure the front access points of a network connected node from a number
of threats and attacks [7]. Cryptography allows for secure communication, whereas access control
is deployed for authentication purposes. However, these anti-threat applications can only provide
external security and are thus inadequate in detecting internal attacks or providing internal security
to any computer system and network. IDSs address this problem by monitoring and detecting both
internal and external attacks.
IDSs are hardware or software systems that automatically identify and respond to attacks
on computer systems. Depending on IDS alerts, IRSs continuously monitor system health to
effectively identify and address potential incidents or inappropriate activities [4]. IRSs apply suitable
countermeasures to ensure security in a computing environment. Consequently, a proper mechanism
for checking the optimum response of these systems is to implement alert procedures. In addition,
techniques for statistically detecting attacks and categorizing attacks in terms of how they affect data
integrity, availability, and confidentiality are necessary. For instance, if an attack affects the integrity
of an enterprise database system, there is a need for an appropriate response to secure data integrity.
However, if the attack is against the network the response should improve resource availability and
network performance.
Responses cannot be evaluated without considering the proceeding incidents, as seen in Figure 1.
Thus, in this instance, the main objectives of incident classification are to examine possible incidents,
determine actual attacks and respective targets, and choose appropriate response options to counter
such attacks. Thus, an incident may refer to any unexpected event that occurs during a program
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execution in a network [8]. Specifically, an-incident occurs when an attack (natural or man-made)
exploits information resources [9]. Most of the security attacks are categorized based on Figure 1.Algorithms 2017, 10, 39 4 of 23 
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host-based attacks such as spamming, race condition attacks, buffer overflow attacks, mail forgery, and
man-in-the-middle attacks. Host-based attacks are mostly attacks against system availability, operating
systems performance, and web service operations [11]. Network-based incidents include attacks on
networks aimed at affecting network availability and performance. Unlike in wired networks, in which
attackers target victim networks through firewalls and gateways, attackers of wireless ad hoc networks
usually gain access from several access point and target any open node.
Figure 1 presents a diagram of a computer network and also presents general attacks that may be
targeted at an organization [10,12]. These attacks are categorized as insider, outsider, active, passive,
distributed, sniffing, spoofing, and DDoS/DoS attacks. These attacks can have some effects on system
security policies such as confidentiality, integrity, and the availability of computing resources (CIA).
Table 2 describes general attacks and network-based attacks. A detailed description of each attack
is given in the following table. The main categorization of these attacks is presented based on Table 2,
which highlights active attacks, passive attacks, insider attacks, outsider attacks, DoS, DDoS, covert
channel attacks, and side channel attacks. The attack classification aims to support the selection of a
suitable response option on the basis of the specific attack behavior.
Table 2. Types of intrusions/attacks.
Types of Attacks Ref. Attack Name Description
Active Attacks [7]
Routing
Attacks
Black Hole Refers to dropped traffic in networks.
Gray Hole Behaves like a malicious node to drop malicious packets,but later switches back to normal.
Rushing A malicious node raising the speed of the routing process.
Man in the
Middle
Attacker secretly relays and intercepts messages between
two parties.
Sleep
Deprivation
It targets the sensor of nodes to maximize power
consumption.
Spoof
When an attacker imitates someone else’s device or a user
in order to initiate attacks against network hosts, bypass
access controls, steal data, or spread malware.
Sybil It is an attack wherein a reputation system is subverted byforeign identities in P2P networks.
Malicious Packet Dropping It is a type of DDoS attack similar to black hole attacks.
Passive Attacks [5]
Eavesdropping Network layer attacks that intercept privatecommunication.
Traffic Analysis An attack that examines the communication patternsbetween entities in a system.
Location Disclosure Can expose anything about the network structure or thenodes’ locations.
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Table 2. Cont.
Types of Attacks Ref. Attack Name Description
Fraud [9]
Hijacked The attackers take control of communication betweennodes and networks, alias man-in-the-middle attacks.
Defacement It changes the physical appearance of a website or page.
Phishing It is an e-mail fraud scam that tries to obtain credentialssuch as credit card details, usernames, and passwords.
Illegal Investment Investment through others’ accounts in an illegal way.
Account Compromised -
Site This fraud occurs when a user opens an infected website.
Purchase Using fake or stolen credit card for a transaction. The mostcommon fraud is credit cards.
Lottery Scam
An advanced type of Internet fraud where you get an
unexpected e-mail explaining that you won a huge
amount to attract victims.
Unauthorized Transaction Using stolen information from someone’s credit card toperform a transaction.
Counterfeit Item Making a fake or copy of original items.
Online
Criminal activities performed online: attackers may get
someone’s personal information, credit card data, or
anything else private in an illegal way.
Sniffer Attacks [10] - Capturing network packets and interrupting networkprotocol analyzing activities.
Covert Channel
Attacks
[11]
Storage Channel Attacks
A covert channel allows transfer of information by an
unauthorized process. A storage channel communicates
by modifying a storage location. A timing channel
performs operations that affect the response time observed
by the receiver.Timing Channel Attacks
Side-Channel-Attacks [12]
Timing-driven attacks This is a common threat to multi-level system such as
databases, operating systems, and networks in which
attackers extract information about the sensor of data that
is used in the devices.
Access-driven attacks
Trace-driven attacks
Low rate TCP
Attacks [13]
It sends a burst of settled-timed packets, conceiving
packet loss and incrementing the retransmission timeout
for certain TCP flows. It has a severe impact on the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP).
Close-in Attacks [5] -
Social engineering is the main type of this attack. Getting
closer to the network devices to get more information
about them is known as a close-in attack.
Exploit Attacks [7] - Using illegal means to utilize something toone’s advantage.
Insider Attacks [7]
User to Root (U2R) An attacker accesses the account of normal users on asystem and exploits some vulnerability.
Port Scanning Scan the free and less secure port for attempting attacks.
Flooding Sending requests to a server at the same time to shut itdown by keeping the system busy.
Malicious Attacks [14]
Bot/ Botnet A network of infected devices connected to the Internetperforms criminal activities in a group.
Malware This is software specially designed to damage or destroy asystem or database.
Malware Hosting The place where malware resides can be mobile or aPersonal Computer (PC).
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Table 2. Cont.
Types of Attacks Ref. Attack Name Description
DDOS/DOS [10]
Buffer Overflow When a program overruns the buffer boundary andoverwrites the adjacent memory location.
Ping of Death It is a request that destroys the target device by putting aninvalid packet size value in the packet header.
ICMP It is a kind of DDoS attack sending a huge flood of ICMPpackets to the victim machine in order to crash it.
Smurf Sending a large number of ICMP packets to performDDoS attack.
UDP Flood Sending a large number of UDP packets to random ports.
SYN Flood Consume enough server resources to make the systemunresponsive to legitimate traffic.
Cyber Harassment [15]
Cyberbullying A type of bullying using the Internet. This attack can beperformed using mobile devices or websites.
Cyber Stalking Using electronic media such as e-mail messages to harassa victim.
Sexual
The Internet is the main source for the sexual harassment,
harassment using Internet-based technologies such as
email and social media platform.
Religious Includes forced religion conversion using electronic mediaand social media.
Racial Refers to harassment suffered by individuals or groupsbecause of their color or race.
Vulnerabilities
Report [16]
Web An interlinked documents type of hypertext that isaccessed through the Internet.
Misconfiguration
Configuration mistakes that result in unintended
application behavior that includes misuse of default
passwords, privileges, and excessive debugging
information disclosure.
System -
Probing [17] - Combining several different familiar dodging techniquesfor network attacks.
Content-Related
National -
Intellectual Properties After research and work, finding something new orinventing something as the result of creativity is called IP.
Pornography Magazines, pictures, or movies that show naked people orsex in an open way.
SQL Injection [18] -
SQL injection is a code injection technique performed to
attack data-driven applications to inject SQL statements
for malicious intent.
Spam [19]
Spam Relay Sending e-mails to a huge number of victims by hiding thesource address of e-mails.
Spam
Sending the same messages to a large number of Internet
users. These inappropriate or irrelevant e-mails are sent
on the Internet to a huge number of victims.
Remote to Local
User [20] - Man-in-the-middle attacks can take place here.
Distributed Attacks [19]
Backdoor Program -
Trojan Horse A computer application or software that sends maliciousemails or spam, or performs DDoS attacks.
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Table 2. Cont.
Types of Attacks Ref. Attack Name Description
Application Layer [21] - It is very hard to defend, and vulnerabilities are alwaysencountered here for complex user input.
Compromised Key [22] -
Attacker uses stolen key to gain access to the secure
system or transmission, which allows the user to decrypt
the encrypted data being sent by someone or a system.
Password Attacks [23]
Dictionary Dictionary attacks are used for decrypting the encryptedmessage.
Login Brute Force
Mainly aims to get access to a website by applying the
simplest method. It always involves trying several
usernames and passwords again and again.
Hybrid It is a combination of dictionary and brute force attacks.
Adversarial
Attacks against IDS [5]
Evasion Attacker tries to change the intrusion pattern in order todeceive the IDRS.
Overstimulation Intruders try to feed the IDRS with a huge number ofattacks pattern to enforce to generate many false alarms.
Poisoning
Attacker tries to inject a well-crafted pattern into the data,
aiming to alter the data that are used to train and
construct the detection algorithm.
Reverse Engineering Adversary tries to access the internal processing of IDRSand stimulates the IDRS with a familiar attack signature.
3. Common Solutions to Intrusions
Presently firewalls, access control, and cryptography are the main defensive mechanisms deployed
against intrusions. As mentioned previously, these mechanisms function as the first line of defense
of any network-connected, computer-based system. Cryptography is employed to ensure secure
communication, whereas access control is used for user authentication. Both anti-threat applications
assist to secure the overall system, but only provide external security. Thus they are inadequate in
providing internal security to computer systems. A firewall is either a software or hardware system
used to control incoming and outgoing traffic according to predefined rules. A basic firewall is installed
at the entry points of servers to divert or allow Internet Protocols (IPs) and IP addresses. A firewall
permit the arriving traffic from the worldwide through internet to access open available services such
as hypertext transfer protocols and domain name servers. A number of operating systems feature
built-in firewalls [24]. These firewalls mainly protect digital devices and contents but traditional ones
cannot detect and block viruses, worms, and Trojan horses.
Although both IDSs and firewalls are used for network security, they have different functions:
firewalls search for external intrusions, whereas IDSs protect against intrusions that originate within
systems [25,26]. D. Sequeira [27] discussed in their research different types of firewalls. Traditional
firewalls cannot detect internal attacks such as flooding attacks, user-to-root attacks, and port
scanning because they only sniff out network packets at the network boundaries. These traditional
firewalls cannot detect a complex attack such as DoS and DDoS. Moreover, traditional firewalls
cannot differentiate between ordinary traffic and DoS attack traffic, as mentioned by [28,29]. Access
control, which serves as the frontline of defense against intrusions, supports both confidentiality and
integrity parameters.
Table 3 summarizes the defensive mechanisms according to the intrusion type and attacks. A few
of the defensive mechanisms such as cryptography, firewall, and access control that are used for
detecting internal attacks are shown in Table 3. However, IDS, IPS, and IRS are used for detecting
internal as well as external attacks.
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Table 3. Solutions to intrusions.
Intrusion Solution Intrusion Types Description Attack Examples
Firewall External It is a system designed to stopunauthorized access.
IP spoofing, eavesdropping, DOS,
port scan, and fragmentation attacks.
Access Control External These are systems that control orlimit illegal access to a system.
Unauthorized access, password
attacks, dictionary attacks, rainbow
table attacks, and sniffer attacks.
Cryptography External To stop the coding or decoding ofsecret messages.
Meet-in-the-middle attacks, brute
force attacks, and birthday attacks.
IDS Internal + External
A system or device that controls
and monitors a network
or system.
DOS, DDOS, user to root (U2R), port
scanning, and flooding.
IPS Internal + External
Network security appliances that
monitor network and/or system
activities for malicious activity.
ICMP storms, ping to death, SSL
evasion, and SMTP mass
mailing attacks.
IDPS Internal + External Also known as IPS DOS and DDOS.
IRS Internal + External DOS, user to root, remote to local,and prob.
3.1. Intrusion Detection System
Different phases that can be deployed as defensive mechanisms are shown in Figure 2. These
phases include preventing, detecting, and responding to intrusions [30]. In the prevention phase,
attacks are prevented before they happen. In the detection phase, analysis tools are developed to
monitor network and host information and also identify intrusions. Response tools are used to
mitigate possible intrusions detected by IDS. As stated by [4], an intrusion is a set of actions that
violate security policies. Any defensive mechanism that prevents attacks before they occur is called
an IPS. IPSs are IDSs that possess the same features of IDS along with the capability of preventing
detected attacks. However, in the prevailing distributed environment, early prevention of attacks is
impractical. An IDS is usually a hardware or software set that monitors events occurring in a computer
system and identifies intrusions. Based on IDS alerts, a security countermeasure (IRS) is used to thwart
detected intrusions.
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Figure 2. Defensive life cycle.
As presented in Table 4, IDSs are classified based on the monitoring environment into two
sub-classes, namely network-based IDSs and host-based IDSs, that is, whether they monitor network
traffic or a host system log file. IDSs are also divided into distributed-based IDSs and hybrid-based IDSs
depending on the data source. According to the detection approach, IDSs are categorized into three
subcategories: anomaly-detection, misuse-detection, and hybrid-detection. IDSs for anomaly detection
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monitor systems for abnormality and are used for unknown attacks. ADEPTS is an anomaly-based
approach that simulates an intrusion based on an attack graph used in identifying and locating
possible attack paths and interdependencies between resources services [31,32]. In misuse detection,
the signature of an attack is matched with the signatures of attacks stored in a database; signature-based
IDSs are used only for known attacks. The IRS developed by Stakhanova [33] is a signature-based IDS
that introduces a response goodness parameter to group a response as either a success or a failure.
USTAT [34] is also a signature-based IDS that uses a state transition diagram for the detection of
attacks; in this IDS, known attacks are represented by the state of the diagram. The hybrid approach is
used for detecting firstly known and then unknown attacks. The mobile visualization hybrid IDS [4] is
an adaptive hybrid IDS that uses an artificial neural network for intrusion detection. A generalized
intrusion detection and prevention (GIDP) mechanism for mobile ad hoc-networks [35] combines
anomaly detection, signature-based approaches and responds to intrusions in a predetermined static
manner by isolating intrusive nodes. An intrusion detection and adaptive response mechanism [36]
uses a hybrid approach, responds to intrusions in a flexible adaptive manner. That is, it selects a
response on the basis of IDS confidence and attack severity, and conducts network performance
degradation. Figure 3 presents the basic architecture of intrusion detection system.
Table 4. Intrusion detection system types.
Types of IDS Description Pros Cons
Host-Based
Host-based IDSs are installed on a
specific machine such as a server
and mobile devices that monitor
the operating system’s audit
information for any sign of
intrusion. In addition, they detect
which programs are accessing
which part of the system
or resources.
• At the transport layer, it
monitors network traffic.
• Does not require
additional hardware.
• Can deal with switched and
encrypted environments.
• Can help with the detection
of a Trojan horse.
• Formation at a host may
cause severe
limitation-of-the network.
• Any other attacks can
involve software
integrity breaches.
Network-Based
Network-based IDSs monitor
network traffic and application
protocol activity between any two
computers for any type of
intrusion.
• Cost-effective.
• NIDS can detect attacks that
are skipped by HIDS.
• Allows for quick response.
• It is easy to deploy as it does
not affect
existing infrastructures.
• It is far from the
individual host.
• Unable to monitor
and analyze
encrypted packets.
• Requires
full-time monitoring.
Hybrid
This is combination of both HIDS
and NIDS components using
mobile agents and a combination
of anomaly- and misuse-based
approaches. A system log file
checker is performed by the
mobile agent traveling to each
host, while the overall network
can be checked by a central agent
for the existence of anomalies.
• Provides in-depth defense.
• Gives administrators the
ability to quantify attacks.
• Provides an additional layer
of protection.
• Provides protection for the
entire network.
• Generates false positives
and false negatives.
• Reacts to attacks rather
than prevents them.
• Generates an enormous
amount of data to
be analyzed.
• It is most expensive.
Distributed
Various IDS (HIDS and NIDS) are
combined by working as faraway
sensors and constructing a report
about intrusions. Later submits
report to a centralized control,
called distributed IDS. Uses
remote sensors that can be
host-based, network-based or
even a combination of host- and
network-based.
• It utilizes traffic information
from various sources.
• Monitoring is controlled by a
central server.
• Detection and response are
also monitored from a
central point.
• Facilitates advanced network
monitoring, incident
analysis, and instant
attack data.
• The flow of data may
generate huge network
movement overheads.
• The system uses data
packets that may be
obtained from a network.
• A program can be edited
or interrupted by
an intruder.
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3.2. Intrusion Response System
An IDS basically g nerates an alert in the form of a report and notification upon the detection
of an intrusion. Without an appropriate security countermeasure, IDS is useless. A response system
should be int grated with IDS to assist and find the sour e of an attack [38]. An IDS is classified as
either passive or active depending on the response system. Passive response is further divided into
notification and manual response, whereas active response is considered automatic. Similarly, an IRS
has three main types: notification, manual, and automatic [39]. In a notification system, a response in
the form of an alert and a report i g nerated and sent through e-mail or notification. By contrast, in
a manual response system a predefined set of response options exists and is triggered by a security
controller with the detection of an intrusion. In these two systems, the time duration within the
detection and response activation opens an opportunity for attackers. The Audit Expert System [30] is
a host-based misuse detection system that employs an expert system to detect intrusions. However, it
simply forwards e-mails, notifications, and reports to system administrators and occasionally generates
and sends urgent notifications to mobile phones.
In contrast to a manual response system, an automatic response system does not involve a human
interface between the detection and response systems. Automatic IRS is further categorized into
adaptive, expert, and association-based. In an adaptive system a feedback loop is used to evaluate
the previous response. Expert system rules are usually applied-as-a-series-of if-then statements.
Furthermore, an expert system uses the signature and anomaly-based approach to detect intrusions.
The distinguishing feature of an expert system-based IRS is the separation of control reasoning from
the formulated solution to the problem. The expert system has a drawback: it requires excessive initial
training and extraordinary care during the lifetime, while in associative-based IRS when an attack
occurs a specific predefined response associated to that specific attack is activated [40]. This approach
is highly static and the basic type is based on an automated response system that initiates a static
automated response upon detection of an attack. These systems are more vulnerable to attackers as
the response option is static and the attackers can easily adapt the signature of the stored response
strategy [41]. Network IRS [42] and USTAT [34] are associative-based response systems. Decision table
and rule-based are the two approaches for automatic systems. The majority of IRSs based on a decision
table are implemented where a specific response is associated with each initially known intrusion.
A number of the existing IRSs [42,43] are implemented as automatic response mechanisms by using a
rule-based approach for determining how to react to possible detected intrusions.
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Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) [44] is
an automatic IRS that provides interoperability, high scalability, and applicability to large network
infrastructures [44]. It is a distributed IDS for large-scale heterogeneous computing environments.
EMERALD overcomes previous IDS limitations and is capable of detecting distributed, coordinated
attacks. Furthermore, it is suitable for detecting attacks in large global networks. A signature engine,
profiler engine, resolver, and resource object are the four main components of EMERALD. The resolver
component is an expert system responsible for analyzing response plans to invoke various response
handlers for global response selection. However, an automatic response system has a problem with
the generation of inappropriate responses, which has a negative effect on response cost and network
performance. Response cost refers to the effect of a generated response option on a system. Therefore, in
an automatic response system a response option strategy is necessary in selecting appropriate response.
From the response options, the optimum response is selected according to the attack statistics.
IRS in networks ensures security is one of the main issues in any computer networks due to
heterogeneous devices that can be easily accessed and utilized. Unsecured communication in a network
allows potential attackers to access the private data of users. Meanwhile, different communication
networks are available, such as Wi-Fi, LTE 3G/4G, and wireless networks, which connect end users to
network resource [45]. The process of transferring data from a PC (source) to the server (destination)
goes through various network communication devices such as routers and switches, from which
possible attackers can capture useful information. However, firewall, encryption, and access controls
are common solutions offered to protect different communication networks from unauthorized access.
These defensive mechanisms are unable to secure the network from malicious traffic and insider
attacks [46,47]. Therefore, the installation of an IRS on the network is necessary to protect the network
from malicious traffic and network-based attacks. Attacks on the network exploit physical, network,
data link, and transport communication protocols.
Moreover, the open nature of the network and the lack of centralized monitoring control make
wireless ad hoc networks more vulnerable to attacks such as DoS, DDoS, sniffer, port scan, and spoofing
attacks [36,48,49]. Common attacks on the network comprise active and passive attacks [35]. Active
attacks disrupt the operation of the attacked network and causes serious damage to the network.
In passive attacks the attackers collect valuable information from the communication link to attack
the functioning element in the network. Jamming, flooding, DoS, hole attacks (wormhole, blackhole,
sinkhole, etc.), and Sybil types are the most common examples of active attacks. Node malfunctioning,
eavesdropping, and node tampering/destruction are examples of passive attacks. Both passive and
active attacks degrade the performance and operation of the entire network. Designing a single security
system or IDS for a large enterprise heterogeneous network is often not practical. This is due to several
challenges associated with existing IDS due to the centralized paradigm architecture that need to
be overcome. Some of these challenges could be addressed by using a distributed architecture and
considering network performance in the design of this architecture.
Therefore, to resolve the aforementioned security issues in the computer network, an IRS must
have automatic countermeasures to continuously monitor network traffic for various types of malicious
activities. The IRS can be divided into two types: autonomous and cooperative [50]. Autonomous IRSs
handle intrusion independently at the time of detection, while cooperative IRSs have the ability to
autonomously configure response systems in finding intrusions in the network. Most of the IRSs in
the network are built based on a cooperative approach. The network-based IRS is deployed in the
transport layer to monitor network traffic for various types of intrusions.
A layered security system can reduce the possibilities of being hacked as it provides multiple
ways of integrating security [51]. In addition, the IRS terminates network connections when any
network traffic matches the stored signature of malicious behavior in its database [52]. CSM, ADEPT,
and network-based IRS are designed for the network environment in detecting any malicious behavior
in the network and also provide useful countermeasure responses [31,42,53]. IDAR [36] is a flexible
and adaptive approach that takes the benefits of both knowledge-based and anomaly-based techniques
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to secure MANET from a variety of attacks. The selection response is based on the confidence level of
the detected intrusions, the attack severity, and the network performance degradation. Furthermore,
some of the IRS in networks are given in Table 5 with underlying detection techniques and description.
Table 5. IRSs in networks.
Domain Ref IRS Underlying DetectionTechniques Description
IRS in
Networks [54] NetSTAT Misuse
To propose IRS, in which stream of audit data is
matched with a stored signature of attacks
descriptions for the evidence of the
occurring attacks.
[55] A-NIDS Anomaly
To detect intrusion events that are previously
unobserved, but for which the false alarm rate
is high.
[56] AIDP Anomaly To propose AIDP in MANET for the detection andmitigation of DDoS attacks.
[36] IDAR Hybrid To provide a flexible response to attacks instead of astatic response without isolating the effected node.
[57] A-NIDSusing Fuzzy Anomaly
To propose intelligent techniques with the help of
machine learning such as fuzzy logic to prevent and
classify network attacks.
[35] GIDP Hybrid To propose a fixed response approach to intrusionsby isolating the intruding node.
Network
IRS N/A
To compare intrusion severity and response cost, an
assessment algorithm is proposed.
4. Comparison of Attacks According to Affected Parameters
Without considering actual attacks, the response options for attacks cannot be evaluated; therefore,
Table 6 is used to illustrate the effects of some of the most popular attacks and their effects on
CIA [29,48]. Intrusion attacks on PCs usually violate the security parameters, previously referred to
as CIA [58]. Attackers try to breach the confidentiality by approaching a computer system or data
storage without approval (either implicit or explicit). When cyber-attackers try to edit any information
residing in or passing through a computer system or to change the-system-state, these attacks are
tantamount to integrity contravention. An intrusion/attack is considered a violation of resources when
cyber-attackers try to make resources unavailable to the target or users.
Some attacks affect the confidentially and integrity of data, whereas some affect service availability.
For instance, flooding attacks (e.g., DoS and DDoS) make the resources of a system unavailable to its
intended users, as shown in Table 6. Therefore, to mitigate these types of attacks IRS must be designed
to improve performance and service availability. Similarly, network sensors are more vulnerable to
availability and confidentiality attacks. The attackers try to overload the network sensor by generating
more packets to flood it, so it fails to process the successive packets. This prevents the network sensors
from getting unauthorized access to the web server and uses a database server to exploit valuable
information. Hence, network-based IDS is implemented to reduce the effects of flooding (DoS or
DDoS) attacks and increase the network bandwidth [59]. Attackers in spoofing attacks and distributed
attacks try to access and modify stored data. Therefore, response options should be selected according
to affected parameters that can improve data confidentiality, availability, and integrity, as shown in
Table 6.
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Table 6. Comparison of attacks according to affected parameters.
Attacks Ref. Example Objectives
Affected Parameters
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Insider [60] Flooding attacks, user to root, andport scanning. The authorized user tries to harm the network.
√
x
√
Flooding Attacks [61] DOS, DDOS,Direct and Indirect DOS,
Attackers try to flood or block a machine or network by
sending invalid information. x x
√
DOS [61,62] Ping of death, Buffer overflow, ICMPflood, Smurf, UDP flood, SYN flood.
Attackers try to make resources unavailable to the
intended users. x x
√
Port Scanning [63]
TCP scanning, UDP Scanning, SYN
scanning, FIN scanning, ACK
scanning, and Window scanning.
Attackers try to find the open port, closed ports, and
filtered port in a list of open ports for attacking services
running on these ports.
x x
√
Application Layer
Attacks or Host
based attacks
[62]
Spamming, race condition attacks,
buffer overflow attacks, and
man-in-the-middle attacks.
These attacks target the application layer and cause faults
in the application or in a server's operating system. x
√ √
Passive attacks [35,64] Eavesdropping, traffic analysis, andlocation disclosure.
The intention of passive attackers is to disturb the
performance and operation of the network and locate
valuable information.
√ √
x
Active attacks [35,64] Routing attacks and malicioustraffic dropping.
Active attacks interrupt the network operation by
introducing malicious code, modifying information, and
causing damage to the entire network, which results in
network performance degradation.
√ √ √
Routing Attacks [65]
Spoofing attacks (IP and URL
spoofing), rushing, gray hole, black
hole, Cybil, man-in-the-middle
attacks, and sleep deprivation.
Routing attacks aim to modify the routing protocol in
mobile ad hoc network (MANET).
√ √ √
Code Red Attacks [66] To exploit a known vulnerability in Microsoft IIS servers. x
√ √
Side Channel
Attack [23]
To extract confidential information from systems by
exploiting computational characteristics.
√ √ √
Covert Channel
Attack [67] To extract secret information by using a covert channel.
√ √ √
Adversarial
Attacks Against
IDS
[59]
These attacks disable the IDRS and affect the detection
accuracy of IDS by modifying their internal processing
and disrupting the functionality of the
detection algorithm.
x x
√
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Data Threats and Response Options
As a result of global networking, which promotes data outsourcing and open access, data
leakage has become a major risk in the context of big data, targeting databases and threatening
privacy. Furthermore, data integrity, availability, and confidentiality are major concerns in large-scale
collaborations, involving big data that frequently change [68,69]. Computer attacks usually violate
three major parameters denoted by CIA plus control [58]. As defined in Section 6, the components of
CIA are the usual targets of attackers. As for attacks on control, a control violation occurs when an
(unauthorized) attacker is granted privilege to violate the access control policy of a system [70].
All the above incidents, as explained in Section 3, affect the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of a computer system and network resources [61]. Specifically, in DDoS and DoS attacks
an attacker slows down a computer system by sending a huge number of queries to a network and
trying to make resources unavailable to authorized users. For such attacks, a response that increases
performance (or service availability) is necessary. In spoof attacks, internal attacks, distributed attacks,
and password-based attacks, a computer system is under the control of attackers who can play with
personal credentials. In this case an efficient response is needed for improving data integrity and
confidentiality. In probing, phishing, and eavesdropping attacks, cyber-attackers attempt to collect
private data and possible vulnerabilities from worldwide networks. In such cases, the response
mechanism should improve service availability and data confidentiality.
5. Responses to Attacks
We live in an era when information technology systems are always prone to risk and may be
compromised. However, organizations are not always prepared to offer a proper response to security
incidents. With the sustained increment in number of incidents, advanced and distinct response
options for response execution process have become necessary. Although Internet users do not always
intentionally probe, monitor, attack, or attempt to access the information of an organization without
authorization, they can potentially do so. A PC in an organization may also be affected by viruses and
potential attacks.
Moreover, digital devices and contents are unsecure because of the connectivity of external
devices. Attacks have become considerably complex and automated existing antiviruses programs
are no longer sufficient. Numerous technical issues including efficiency enhancement of antiviruses
and system damage reduction have yet to be resolved. When IDSs receive threat information, they
generate responses on the basis of the nature of the intrusion/attack. As mentioned in Section 5, IDSs
are categorized as either active or passive according to their response options. Active responses are
those that immediately respond to an intrusion to protect data assets without human participation.
However, the pitfall of this approach is that the security configuration under a passive response is
greater than under an active response [71]. Moreover, passive responses are not automatic response
systems and do require human involvement, thus facilitating the movement of data by authorizing
alarm events on information assets.
However, the disadvantage of this approach is that information assets are usually leaked to
intrusions during security administrator investigation. It may unnecessarily slow up the network
traffic since alarm events are blocked based on responses that generate alarms and report results. In this
approach, some responses are automatic and activated without human involvement. By contrast,
non-automatic response systems need human intervention [70]. The common active responses of IDSs
for hindering possible attacks include suspending IP addresses, blocking IP addresses, blocking ports,
injecting TCP resets to terminate connections, changing access control lists, reconfiguring routers, and
firewalls. IDSs mostly generate alarms in the form of an onscreen alert or a popup window. The Simple
Network Management Protocol traps and reports generate alarms to network management systems.
Using a proper IRS in the form of an antivirus that supports the entire network infrastructure can help
with responding to intrusions within a specific timeframe [72].
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However, in adaptive IRS the response is always dynamic based on the response parameter and
attack nature. During the selection of dynamic response options, the response manager is mostly
concerned about the cost of the response. The requirement of the distributed environment is mainly to
have a cost-sensitive and adaptive IRS. In cost-sensitive IRS, the main contribution is that the cost of any
response should always be lower than the damage cost [50]. Figure 4 illustrates how a suitable response
is selected if the response cost is less than the combined cost of damage and confidence level. The
response process is activated when the pattern detection probability exceeds a predefined threshold,
as shown in Figure 4. Damage cost and response costs (DC and RC respectively) are static input
parameters utilized for optimum response selection. There are two steps that determine the applicable
response. In the first step, the responses are selected based on the condition: DC × confidence
level ≥ RC, where the confidence level is the pattern detection probability. In the second selection step
the cost-sensitive response selection is based on the success-factor (SF) and response-factor (RF) of the
triggered response. The percentage of successful responses in the past is denoted by SF, whereas the
risk factor shows the impact the considered response will have on legal users. EV(Expected value) is
the basis of the ideal response selection for response rS of a sequence where
S: EV (rS) = Prsucc(S) × SF + (Prrisk(S) × (−RF)),
where Prsucc is the probability of the occurrence of sequence S. This study selects the optimum
response only if the (EV (Rs)) value is high, whereas a higher EV indicates a better response.
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Protecting network and computer systems against exploitation before such an exploitation occurs
is impossible because vulnerabilities are not known in advance. Intrusions can occur in a PC without
any connectivity to a network. With the development of a global network and information sharing,
security problems have become more serious than ever. Modern network-based IDSs [73,74] and
host-based IDSs [31,44] can initiate responses in addition to simple alarms or notifications. Analysis
results recorded in a log file are used to generate a report based on the attack response type. Immediate
responses trigger an alarm linked to the network manager console, after which a message is promptly
displayed in the security manager’s page and an e-mail is also sent to a system administrator. These
are possible examples of response options [75]. This section presents some common response options
for host- and network-based IDSs. These responses are summarized in the Table 7 as follows:
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Table 7. Response option for host- and network-based IDSs.
Responses Description
Report/Alarm generation An alarm or report is generated with the detection of an intrusion attack.
Isolation Completely and immediately isolates the affected node.
Relocation Relocates the affected server by allotting a new different address.
No Punishment In some cases, when the response causes a blip in the network performance, it ignoresthe attack.
Service Denial Upon detection of an intrusion, the nodes stop providing services (not sending orreceiving data).
User Account Locking Once the user accounts are changed, the intruders should be locked out.
Remote Locking In this response the affected server is blocked from remote areas.
IP Address Blocking Once the intrusion is detected, the IP address of that network node should be blocked.
Network Disconnection The affected node is disconnected from the network.
Attack Port Disabling The port that may be the cause of an intrusion is disabled.
Backup Creation If there is an attack detected, a backup of the infected device should be created.
In report/alarm generation, intrusive behavior is communicated through reports, e-mail messages,
pager messages, or a console window that provides critical information to system administrators. Next
the intruding node should be completely and immediately isolated from the network. Although the
main disadvantage of this technique is attributed to the network performance degradation. A GIDP
mechanism responder should be installed to detect incidents in all cases in a predetermined fixed
mode by isolating the intrusive nodes that may cause a variety of attacks [35,76]. In some cases the
direct isolation of critical attackers could cause the whole network to shut down; thus, in avoiding
such a case, a relocation response is adopted for securing the network system [77].
Furthermore, in a no-punishment response an intrusion is simply ignored when the performance
of the network is not affected by the intrusion. In addition, if the cost of the response is greater than the
cost of damage from attack, the no-punishment response option is activated from pre-stored response
options. In a service denial response a network node terminates the services offered by or provided
to intruders. The locking of user accounts is a response in which the account of a user is locked and
the session of the user is terminated to prevent future attacks. The purpose of an ICMP response
is to ensure that the attacking host identifies the victim network or prevents a “requested service is
unavailable” response [78].
However, differentiating true attackers from normal users is difficult, so enabling remote logging
in to another system is the best method to collect additional information about attackers. Blocking
the IP addresses of specific attackers is also an alternative. The shutdown response option is the
most suitable mechanism for protecting a network or a computer system under active attack from
being further compromised. Network disconnection is an appropriate solution against network-based
attacks when shutting down the host or the network system is not an option. In a response involving
the disabling of attacked ports, a specific port used as the basis for attack generation is disabled. These
responses effectively stop attacks without affecting other system resources.
Symantec Security Response systems protect computer systems from Code Red attacks.
Code Red [79] is an attack on the IIS (Microsoft Internet Information) web server. Symantec Security
Response offers a tool for performing vulnerability assessment on a high number of infected IIS web
servers to remove Code Red attacks. Creating an up-to-date system backup is one of the responses to
prevent attacks against system integrity. Real-time backup is difficult because the degree of suspicion
is increased when a network system is being attacked, thus the time gap should be decreased within
backups to limit the loss of or maintain the integrity of data. Figure 5 categorizes the intrusion response
options according to whether they generate an active response or passive response during the response
selection process. An active response refers to a response that is used to counter an incident in order to
minimize the impact on victims [80].
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6.1. Real-Time Response
In IRS the real-time response improves the security level by early warning security and intrusion
violation threats. Thus the response system should be accurate, automatic, and active in distinguishing
malicious from non-malicious activities. However, IDS products existing today are insufficient in
accuracy and generate a huge false positive rate (FPR). In some cases these products are generating
thousands of FPR in a single day. In this technological age it is imperative to have a proper mechanism
for managing false alarms. Therefore, IRSs must be active and smart in distinguishing malicious
activities from non-malicious activities. In addition, IDS and IRS have the capability to categorize
responses according to the nature of the attacks and activate a response accordingly during the response
selection process.
The time gap between a detected intrusion and a response creates a window of vulnerability for
attackers. Another problem faced by all detection and response systems is the difficulty in analyzing
packets in real-time traffic. This results in another problem that limits traffic access, thus making it
very difficult for a network designer to concentrate on interpreting network performance rather than
network visibility.
6.2. Alert Parallelization
In any distributed systems there are different types of IRSs that aim to monitor cyber-attacks.
In each system a correlation component is inserted and should be installed on each and every host
that cooperates with response and detection process. However, any intrusion correlation requires
perceptive information from various systems to determine and observe the intrusions to be managed.
An ontology-based intrusion alert system was presented in a study conducted by Kruegel et al. [81], but
this method was insufficient for detecting zero-day attacks [81]. The alert parallelization can improve
the quality of an IRS alert system by quickly identifying and monitoring intrusions. The parallelization
management, alert aggregation, knowledge-based acquisition, and alerts evaluation are the most
pressing challenges that should be solved.
6.3. Controlling-False Alarm
Uncertainties remain in the detection of intrusions despite the extensive research on IDSs.
Moreover, the verification of whether an attack is an actual attack or a false alarm is beyond the
scope of current IDSs. Therefore, a mechanism that allows IRSs to handle the false alarms generated
by IDSs should be developed. IDS products’ detection capabilities can be characterized in terms of
accuracy and specificity. Inaccuracy in IDS in terms of generating false alarms is a huge challenge
presently faced by automated response systems. Accuracy is often measured as the “true detection
rate”, sometimes referred to as the “false-negative rate” and the “false-positive rate”. The true detection
rate specifies how successful a system is in detecting attacks when they occur in real time.
6.4. Risk Assessment
The majority of existing studies consider individual topics in design issues. For instance, risk
needs to be considered in designing IRSs to mitigate attacks. Selecting a good response option by IRS
increases the security performance against an intruder. However, an optimum response decreases
service availability.
7. Future Directions
False alarm handler, Dynamic Response Metrics, and Online Risk Assessment are important
issues from an IRS design point of view. This survey shows that the currently available IRSs are unable
to handle false alarms and also fail to implement an instant response, according to the attack statistics.
These three parameters (False alarm handler, Dynamic Response Metrics, and Online Risk Assessment)
must be included in the design of IRSs for the selection of appropriate response. There is still a need
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for research on IRS to take these three parameters into consideration. Thus in future work an IRS with
a false alarm handler should be included to handle the false alarms generated by IDSs. Most of the
existing approaches are based on a static approach, where intrusions are mostly isolated during the
response selection process. This may cause a reduction in system performance. Therefore, in future
work IRSs will be integrated with a dynamic response approach to increase the network’s system
performance. Furthermore, with the use of online risk assessment future IRS design should be more
effective at addressing this issue. However, lots of research needs to be carried out in the area of online
risk assessment during the design of automated response systems.
8. Conclusions
This research study provides a comprehensive explanation of intrusions in terms of their detection
and corresponding responses. A few decades back, emphasis was placed on the development of
automatic IRSs to overcome the effects of different intrusions. However, IRSs still require extensive
research, especially with regard to the selection of proper response options through an automatic
response selection process based on intrusion types. Different response options must be activated and
executed for each intrusion type to mitigate and overcome the effects of such intrusions. However,
developing a perfect automatic IRS that completely detects and prevents different types of intrusions
is still a challenge. Therefore, IRSs are considered a trending and growing research domain to be
explored in terms of response option selection, response time, attack mitigation, alert generation, and
adaptability. Comprehensive research must be conducted to achieve the goal of establishing an optimal
automated IRS design and architectural framework.
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